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ON THE I-THOU RELATION IN ZEN BUDDHISM
I
Kydzan (Ejaku) asked Sanshfl (Enen): “What is your name ?” 
Sansho replied, “My name is Ejaku.” “Ejaku !” said KyOzan, 
“that’s me!” “Well then,” replied Sanshd, “my name is 
Enen.” KyOzan roared with laughter.
Dai to Kokushi said of this : “Whither does [this] go ?”
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The sun shines warmly, the spring snow clears;
The jaws of the plum and the face of the willow vie with 
their fragrant freshness.
The occasion for poetry and spiritual divertissement holds 
boundless meaning,
Permitted only to the man who wanders in the fields and 
arduously composes poetry.1
1 Ddt&roku (“The Sayings of DaitO Kokushi”), book 3, fas. 11, under
“Juko” . Also^cHft- KwaianJtoku-go, book 5, under "Juko.”
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This encounter between KyOzan and SanshO is an old and 
well known Zen koan included in the collection entitled The Blue
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Cliff Records1 where it bears the title “Ryazan Roars with 
Laughter?' It can be said to show the true significance in the 
encounter of one man with another.
1 J.» Htkiganroku; C., Pi-yen-lu.
We are continually encountering others: within the family, our 
wives and children; at work, our colleagues; on the streets or in 
conveyances, men who are complete strangers to us. Through 
history we are able to meet men of hundreds, even thousands of 
years ago. Still we do not consider such encounters unusual, and 
we certainly do not marvel at them. Yet what is to be found at 
the deepmost ground in the encounter between man and man ? Basi­
cally what is it that makes such an occurrence possible ? This mondo 
probes these questions and unfolds and makes clear the boundless 
horror and the infinite beauty that are included at the depths of 
this everyday event.
It must be emphasized that such an investigation is utterly im­
possible to accomplish from without, from some place distant to the 
encounter. Neither is it possible to accomplish it by means of 
biological, sociological, anthropological, ethical, or other such 
methods. All such explanations want to solve the whole problem 
at a place that has not attained the deepest ground.
For example, no matter how much man speaks of human rights, 
no matter how much he debates them, the problem of the encounter 
between men will never be solved in such a way. From such a 
standpoint one remains helpless before the Hobbesian homo homini 
lupus, or the “wolfish man” of the German mystic Heinrich Seuse. 
The Kantian standpoint of the personality, wherein one acknowl­
edges another’s personal dignity, cannot reach to the depths which 
lie enclosed in the encounters between men; philosophical and 
theological probings do not generally extend to the boundless 
abysses that lie hidden here. One cannot, for example, resist the 
impression that in viewing the problem of man’s relation to man 
from within the communio sanctorum of the Christian church, one 
is, as an old Chinese proverb puts it, scratching an itchy foot with-
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out taking off the shoe. One does, to be sure, reach the spot that 
itches, but only indirectly because of the leather in between. Since 
Martin Buber, such an encounter has been emphasized as being a 
personal relation between “I” and ‘‘Thou.” This is no doubt true, 
but it is obvious that there lies a great problem hidden right in the 
depths of this personal I-Thou relation. The Zen “exploration” 
takes its departure from this problem.
Here, two points will be thoroughly and uncompromisingly 
taken into account. The first is that the I as well as the Thou are 
absolutes in their respective subjectivities. The second is that the I 
and the Thou directly through their relation upon one another are, 
on the other hand, absolutely relative.
The subject as an absolute has been conceived in various ways, 
that every man is a wolf to every other man is but one expression of 
absolute subjectivity. Another is the Kantian concept of personality, 
where man’s moral will is autonomous and in no way permits 
determination from without, not even from God. So it is with 
personality in the religious sense as well, with the I in the same 
relation to God as it is to the “Absolute other” (or Absolute Thou). 
All these naturally indicate, each in its own dimension, the abso­
luteness of the individual subjectivity which permits no surrogation. 
All these standpoints, however, allow either over or else within man 
as individual something that has the character of law or of the 
universal. Through this Universal the relationship of one individual 
to another is established, and the individual is partially relativized 
and thus checked on the way to absolute individuation.
The universal takes many forms. For men who encounter one 
another as wolves, it is the state and the authority of its laws; 
for the ethical personality, it is practical reason and its moral law ; 
for the religious personality, it is the “Absolute Other ” and divine 
law that become the universal ground for the relation between men. 
But the general structure of these relations — the relationship be­
tween individuals based on the universal — always has a halfway 
character about it, and this lack results in a twofold obscurity. 
While, on the one hand, the individual accepts an unsubstitutable
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subjectivity (and with it an accordingly complete freedom), still all 
individuals are at the same time subordinated to some kind of 
universal. In relation to this subordination all individuals are equal; 
that means each individual person can represent any other individual. 
To give an example: A funeral takes place in the neighborhood, so 
the head of the household wants to offer condolences as the repre­
sentative of his whole family. Perhaps, however, he is prevented 
from doing so, and his wife goes in his stead. If they are both 
unable to attend the funeral, the eldest son might undertake the task. 
Each can in a similar manner represent the family, and therefore the 
members of the family can mutually represent one another. This 
implies, however, nothing else than the possibility of substitution or 
surrogation. Freedom arises from the impossibility of individual 
substitution. Equality arises from the possibility of this substitution. 
A union of freedom and sameness or equality therefore implies an 
imperfect freedom. That is to say, when each individual is related 
to a universal, thereby creating a mutual relation as well, then the 
individual loses his absoluteness, and is relativized. This is one of 
the obscurities; all the difficulties concerning the relation of freedom 
and equality return to it.
But this imperfect freedom implies, when considered from the 
other side, an imperfect sameness of equality as well. Subordination 
to a universal cannot completely absorb the freedom of the indi­
vidual as individual. Freedom, which escapes from the net of uni­
versality, sometimes arouses itself and becomes freedom untram­
melled by law. The power of the state’s law cannot wholly trans­
form the wolf into a sheep, therefore he will occasionally commit 
some violent act in a limited sphere, or on a grand scale he may 
become the violent Will to Power incarnate. The dignity and rigor 
of moral law cannot completely extinguish man’s self-love; to be sure, 
self-love can deepen into the “radical evil” of which Kant speaks. 
The sanctity of divine law cannot keep rein on the obstinate appetites 
of man. Man will turn his back on God and follow the seductions 
Satan offers him. The citizen who represented the family at the 
neighborhood funeral may, upon completion of his duty, go direct­
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ly to a secret mistress. The son in the same circumstance may buy 
a ticket to the cinema with money pilfered from the cookie-jar. In 
short, in the individuals who are relativized by their representation 
of one or another form of the universal the equality is likewise 
imperfect. This is the second obscurity. All this means that there 
is no real encounter between man and man in an interhuman relation 
where the universal is included, and where freedom and equality 
are obliged to go hand in hand in their incompleteness. In the 
“natural state” of the wolfish man the original basis of man’s 
encounter with man is of course hidden, but it is also hidden under 
the law of the state, moral law, and divine law as well.
When subordination to a universal cannot absorb completely 
the freedom of the individual’s private self, the irritated universal 
may attempt to squeeze the breath from the individual freedom in 
order to realize equality. This tendency is manifested when so­
cialism passes into totalitarianism. Yet a genuinely absolute equality 
cannot be realized in this way. For it to be realized the universal 
must be able to completely absorb the private self and its individual 
freedom, but at the same time — since were the individual to come 
completely to naught, there would be nothing to which the mutual 
sameness could relate itself, and the concept of sameness or equality 
would itself be rendered meaningless — it must somehow be able to 
completely expel and emancipate the individual and his personal 
freedom again.
It would have to be something in which the absolute negation 
of the individual and his freedom are simultaneously absolute af­
firmation, and also in which absolute affirmation is simultaneously 
absolute negation. It would have to be a case of equality, with 
the negation of the individual and his personal freedom becoming 
one with the absolute affirmation of the individual and his free­
dom. But is such a universal possible? It is not possible apart from 
absolute nothingness — non-being — absolute void in the Buddhist 
sense (fanyatd). A universal that would posit itself in a relation to 
the individual, and thus become a universal that is — be it as state, 
practical reason, God, etc.—would in any case mediate, each ac­
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cording to its own law, between individual and individual, and 
through this bring them to unity. Within this unity through law 
the universal manifests itself as being, as something with self-identity, 
as “substance.” State, reason, and God are “beings,” or “substance”; 
there the relation between man and man itself is substantial. The 
individual, therefore, loses half of itself in the relation. Here it 
cannot be an absolute individual completely absolved from all rela­
tions, simply standing independently as a whole. On the other side, 
the universal, to a certain extent, is inherent within individuals, 
and brings forth from within them their relation to each other. In 
its immanency it cannot completely transcend the individual and 
cannot, as it were, deprive him of his roots. Therefore, as the 
individual’s freedom becomes more and more emphasized, the unity 
through law gradually becomes worm-eaten and in the end dissolves 
altogether. This tendency is manifested in the lapse from liberalism 
into anarchism. One could call anarchism a “natural state” elevated 
to a higher plane. But through it real freedom will never be achieved.
There is only one situation in which complete freedom can be 
attained without falling into anarchism. It must be one in which 
freedom and equality — essentially contradictory —• can co-exist in 
a paradoxical way. Indeed this can only happen where the place 
of Void becomes the place of freedom ; and the place of void is at­
tained when equality, which tends to negate freedom, is traversed 
into the consequent end of absolute negation or nothingness. True 
freedom can only be consummated when its absolute negation is its 
absolute affirmation. Anything else would only mean a hither- 
thither wobbling between the poles of totalitarianism and anarchism. 
(Here of course totalitarianism and anarchism are not meant in a 
political sense alone, but in a sense extending to all categories of 
man’s relation with man.) Totalitarianism includes the possibility 
of immediately changing into anarchism, and vice versa; between 
the two extremes the path to anarchism and the path to totalitarian­
ism frequently interweave.
76
ON THE I-THOU RELATION IN ZEN BUDDHISM
II
I have dwelled at some length upon a reality we experience 
every day of our lives, and the reader has perhaps wondered what 
connection all this has with the strange Zen mondo — one of those 
characteristically terse dialogues — a record of the exchange be­
tween two Zen monks in ancient China. The fact is that this mondo 
encompasses all of the matters we have dealt with. Therefore, let 
us return to the original problem, which is to achieve recognition, 
completely and without any half-way compromises, of the dual 
circumstance in which Zand Thou are as subjects respective absolutes, 
and at the same time also absolutely relative. Unless we go back 
to this point we will be unable to attain a true freedom or equality, 
a true individual, or the true universal. But the fact that Z and the 
Thou are each thoroughly absolute means that each of them is ab­
solutely absolute. The fact that each of them is absolutely absolute 
means that both of them are absolutely relative. This is an outright 
contradiction — it sounds like pure nonsense. It would mean ab­
solute hostility with one person the absolute enemy of the other, 
where, as an old Chinese saying says, one cannot live under the 
same sky with the other. Where they cannot share the same sky, 
one must kill the other. This is the relation, homo homini lupus, 
which leads to an eat or be eaten situation. In such a situation, 
however, all relatives would be entirely eliminated. That is, in 
maintaining a relative, respective absolutes are unallowable; more­
over, no basis exists for accepting one and rejecting another. Both 
are entirely equal. For this reason, arch-enemies who are unable 
to live together under the same sky nevertheless coexist in a total­
ly efficacious manner. If this becomes out of the question, then 
they must be content to reach a compromise by means of a universal 
and its law. Such a compromise will always be pregnant with 
contradictions ; it breeds conflict, and is always exposed to danger 
of collapse. This is revealed in the historical events of each and 
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every time. It is the boundless “Suffering” that the Buddha said 
forms the way of the World. The basis of this problem is found in 
the relation between one man and another, where the simple fact ob­
tains that two men generally exist side by side, in the impossible 
fact that there are two, indeed, countless absolutes existing side by 
side. For a very long time this fact has been an everyday reality, 
a reality in which the impossible has indeed become the possible. 
But from it originates as well, at the same time, unending entangle­
ment and boundless suffering. That being the case, how does Zen 
solve the reality of this situation ? How does it attempt to prove 
possible the absurd notion that absolute enmity is at the same time 
absolute harmony?
Kydzan asked Sansho what his name was. Going back into the 
history of mankind far enough we find that the “name” had a very 
profound significance. It symbolized the bearer himself, it was a 
manifestation of him, and gradually came to be one with him. This 
played a great role in magic, religion, and other areas of social life. 
For example, for a woman to disclose her name to a man meant 
she was revealing herself before him and in the same breath signify­
ing she had already given herself to him. Later on in history, we 
come to the expressions “Amida’s Name” and “In Jesus Christs 
Name” which imply that God and Buddha are proclaiming them­
selves, giving themselves, revealing themselves before mankind. 
Coming closer to the present, we find the name becoming more and 
more “simply a name.” We reach the point where man begins 
to boast of his own awakening intellect, and the beginning of the 
modern scientific spirit and the establishment of nominalism and 
empiricism appears. But the question remains whether one can 
simply relegate the name seen as one with existence to being a 
manifestation of a mythological age prior to the emancipation of 
the intellect. Perhaps completely the opposite is true, that men in 
those days stood in contact with Reality in a very real way, indeed 
found themselves directly within Reality. Perhaps the name was 
realiter perceived because Reality was concretely lived, intimately 
felt and directly realized. Would not this indicate that the later 
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interpretation of the name as “merely a name” is a matter of the 
intellect being isolated from Reality? Does it not conceal the 
“awakened intellect’s” descent to a deeper blindness ? It could well 
be that the pride of the so-called scientific age is an expression of 
folly still unaware of its deep blindness. Be all that as it may, Rya­
zan and Sanshd are not men of a mythological age. Zen is such a 
wholly “demythologized” religion that it can admonish its followers 
to “Kill the Buddha and all the Patriarchs! ” It seems safe to assume, 
therefore, that in this dialogue it is only the “mere name” that is 
being requested. But Sanshd has long been recognized as a great 
Zen master, and we certainly should not suppose that Kydzan does 
not know his own name. Therefore it is clear that Ryazan’s ques­
tion is not simply a request for Sanshd’s name on an intellectual 
level. Rather the question means the beginning of a “Zen-occur- 
rence” in the simple encounter between two men. At the same time 
it becomes the occasion to penetrate and explore thoroughly a hap­
pening that takes place every day between two ordinary men. I 
mentioned before about the two men whose natures made it impos­
sible for them to live together under the same sky, and yet did, in 
fact, do just that. I said that this impossibility becomes a possibility 
in the reality of everyday life. Here is where the exploration of 
Reality within that reality begins.
Engo (Yiian-wu, 1062-1135) comments on the question “What 
is your name ? ” as follows: “He robs at one time the name and 
the being.” To ask someone for his name is also to take his being 
to yourself as well. The 18th century Zen master Hakuin said of 
this question that “it is like a policeman interrogating some sus­
picious fellow he has found loitering about in the dark.” That does 
not mean Kydzan himself would place such a meaning on his ques­
tion, but the question itself takes on such a color. When that which 
possesses the nature of the absolute operates in the relative world its 
operation comes of itself to shut out all relativity. Things that 
stand opposite the self as “others,” will all be stopped short in their 
tracks, drawn across to the side of this self, and finally be annexed 
to it Inasmuch as the self is its own complete master, and retains 
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its subjectivity — inasmuch as it is the “self ’ in its true sense — this 
will happen naturally. This means that KyOzan is KyOzan. Yet, 
from its own standpoint, inasmuch as the Thou is a subject, the 
same would hold true for it. The essence of this “I-Thou Relation” 
is characterized by none other than the problem of eat or be eaten.
Engo added a jakugo (literally, “comment under-written”) to 
this dialogue, which goes as follows : “He (KyOzan) trapped him. 
He thought he had him, but to his astonishment it was a thief he had 
caught. The thief turned the tables and robbed him of everything 
he owned.”
When asked his name, Sansho answered “Ejaku,” but Ejaku 
was the name of the questioner, KyOzan. In his answer Sansho in 
effect takes KyOzan s absolute nature — KyOzan, who is KyOzan 
himself, and who will not allow any Thou to stand opposite him ; 
KyOzan, who would take all others to himself — as it is, for his own. 
He simultaneously seizes all KyOzan’s actions and true existence 
from behind, going around hostile defenses and running up the 
banner of his own self in the rear. In so doing he pulls the floor from 
under KyOzan’s feet.
What is more, this is all done in accordance with Sansho’s 
genuine self. Engo comments that with his answer Sansho cuts 
KyOzan’s tongue off. “He snatches flag and drum away from him.” 
As he cuts off KyOzan’s tongue — and with it the contest and Rya­
zan's self that dared to question him — he snatches away the signs 
of victory, and the nature whereof Sansho is Sansho appears.
If we look back to that aspect of KyOzan’s self that originally 
asked the question, we can see that it arises upon the same elemental 
ground. KyOzan robs Sansho of his name and being, he steals San­
sho s self. Consequently, they remain in a relation of absolute 
enmity. But now the essential point is that the subjective relation 
between man and man is no longer the relation of I and Thou in 
the universal meaning. When Sansho calls himself by KyOzan’s 
name (Ejaku) Sansho is KyOzan. The I is the Thou, the Thou is 
the Z. It is the same from KyOzan’s standpoint. In short, the I is 
not merely an ordinary Z; it is the I (Sansho) that is at the same 
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time Thou (KyOzan). The Thou is no simple Thou; it is the Thou 
that is simultaneously I. Hence the I and the Thou blend com* 
pletely into one another. Here one might think of absolute non­
differentiation, absolute sameness, or absolute oneness. In western 
thought it has been expressed as Oneness (for example, by Plotinus), 
or as Absolute Identity (for example, by Schelling). Here no more 
relation exists, and there is nothing that can lead to one. There is 
neither self nor other, thus there is no person and no personal re­
lation. This mondo might seem to indicate that the reality of the 
I-Thou relation is essentially simply a return to the problem of 
non-discrimination. Yet it is just the opposite. Although every 
simple non-discrimination is separated from reality, the problem 
surely is one actually involving the reality of the I and Thou, and 
actually including as well the reality of the encounter between man 
and man and the absolute opposition that incurs therein. Only this 
I and this Thou are not a simple I and Thou. Since the I is the 
Thou, and the Thou is the I, both are absolutely non-differentiated. 
For the I, this absolute non-differentiation belongs to the I itself; it 
is correspondingly the same for the Thou. In this way the I is a 
true I, and the Thou is a true Thou. This is the genuine I-Thou 
relation. We might formulate this paradox in the manner of the 
Diamond Sutra'. The I-Thou relation is an I-Thou relation 
because it is not an I-Thou relation. This reveals as well the neces­
sity for an absolute opposition. The I and the Thou that contend 
with one another for the ground of absolute non-differentiation—• 
each asserting it belongs to him (which it essentially does)—are thus 
really absolutely related to one another and therefore relative. They 
are an I and a Thou that as genuine subjects are absolutely different 
from each other. Here, there is no relation at all between I and 
Thou. Yet it is not non-relation as mere non-differentiation. It is 
non-relation as absolute opposition, and as a relative on the plane 
where all relations have been utterly transcended. In point of fact, 
the reality of the I-Thou encounter in everyday life is one in which 
just such an absolute relativity and just such an absolute opposition 
exist. On the ground of such an encounter lies unbounded horror.
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But stated from the other side, this absolute nature in the ab­
solute relativity comes from the fact that the absolute non-discrimi­
nation belongs to both I and Thou ; and I can be I and Thou can 
be Thou as absolute individuals because each of them is grounded 
on the absolute identity in which I am Thou and Thou are I, and 
every form of relation and relativity is superseded. Here, I am with 
you being in no way discriminated from you, and you are with me 
equally undiscriminated from me.
The act of Sanshd calling himself by Ky Ozan’s name means then 
that he is making himself empty and putting Kydzan in his place. 
Where the other is at the center of the individual and where the 
existence of each one is “other-centric,” absolute harmony reigns. 
This might be called “Love,” in the religious sense. I say in a 
religious sense because it is a case of “void” or “mugs' (non-self) 
that has severed absolutely the self and other from the self and 
other in the relative sense. Thus, absolute opposition is at the same 
time absolute harmony. Both are the same. There, absolute 
opposition is, as it is, a sport, and absolute harmony is not simply 
non-differentiation. Self and other are not one, and not two. Not 
one and not two means that each self retains its absoluteness while 
still being relative, and in this relativity they are never for a moment 
separated. While the I acknowledges the Thou, in relation to the 
Thou’s own absolute non-differentiation, to be the I, and thus permits 
itself to become absolutely the Thou, at the same time it takes the 
Thou to itself. Situated within this absolute non-differentiation 
which opens in the I, the I is the I itself — I am I. Even if we 
call the harmony of this absolute non-relation love, it is still different 
from love in the sense of eros, or in the sense of agape.
In any case, when Sansho said he was Ejaku, KyOzan answered, 
“Ejaku, that’s me 1” whereupon Sansho gave his own name, Enen. 
Of this answer Hakuin remarked, “He has changed himself from 
head to foot. The old fox, with advanced age grown more and more 
cunning, has various tricks of transformation up his sleeve.” Engo 
said, “They both are back to holding their original positions. After 
several changes of form each has returned to his home ground.”
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This happening is no other than the above-mentioned harmony and 
concord—a harmony possessed of infinite beauty. Hakuin compares 
this encounter to a fight between a dragon and an elephant, “tread­
ing on and kicking each other,” and says that “this is no place for 
lame horses and blind asses.” Yet on the other hand he adds, 
“Their joint singing and hand-clapping, drumming and dancing — 
it is as if the spring blossoms let their reds and purples compete 
against one another in the new warmth.” Here each self returns 
to its original position where each is itself. Although each of us 
ought to find in the midst of his everyday encounters the place 
where he, in spite of himself, maintains his original position, we do 
not in fact thoroughly explore and realize such a place. The sole way 
this can be done is to pierce through to the ground of the encounter. 
There, it goes right through the situation of eat or be eaten to that 
of at once eat and be eaten, until the small I of each one dissolves, 
to the place where self and other are not two different things, to the 
place where strife is transformed into sport. Then it will be like 
flowers competing with their reds and purples in the spring warmth. 
Unless the relations between individual and individual, between 
nation and nation, between all factions and all groups, returns to 
this, there remains but the struggle of the wild wolves.
Ill
In light of what has been said, let us now return to the poem 
by the Japanese Zen master Daitd Kokushi (1282-1337), written as 
a commentary on the previous mondo. It is included together 
with the monda in the Kwaiankoku-go, a work in which Hakuin 
(1685-1768) comments upon DaitO’s sayings and poems.
Of the first two lines Hakuin says: “If you trample on and kick 
over the dark valley of the eighth consciousness, the sun of the 
Great Mirror Wisdom will suddenly flash and immediately dissolve 
the piled-up snow-drifts of the abiding aspect of all phenomena.” and 
“He breaks away the solid-frozen all-sameness of the Taihata, he
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melts away the ice of the one Dharma-Nature.”
We might simply call it the transcendence of attachment, self­
attachment and attachment to the Dharma as well. The standpoint 
of the “wolfish man,” as well as the source of the conflict that halves 
mankind, will be found to have their roots in self-attachment which 
puts “one’s self” in the center and thus discriminates between “self’ 
and “other.”
Ultimately, however, this self-attachment itself is rooted in 
so-called Ignorance (mumyo), that is, in the eighth or “store” con­
sciousness (dlayavijndna), the foundation on which human conscious­
ness is based. I was indicating this Ignorance when I stated 
previously that there is a layer of profound blindness at the very 
root of the human intellect. Both Illusion and Suffering have their 
sources there. To subdue these two, various theories and ideologies 
are contrived, and manifold “laws” — civil, moral and divine laws 
for example — are established. But such laws are incapable of 
cutting the powerful root of self-attachment, and self-attachment 
appears under the cover of the laws. One falls into pride in one’s 
country, moral pride, pride in one’s gods or buddhas. If we call such 
things law-attachment, then law-attachment is self-attachment on a 
higher plane. The same holds true for the different ideologies as well.
Law is not bad. What is bad is man’s way of fixing himself 
upon some universal as “being,” his mode of becoming attached 
to law — in heteronomous, autonomous or “theonomous” form. 
The mode of all such law-attachments is precisely the aforementioned 
“abiding aspect of all phenomena.” The various laws included in 
these attachments are the snowpile that covers this mode of attach­
ment. Transcend the plane of the universal, as the non-duality 
of self and other, the Void, or muga (non-self), then for the first 
time the light of the sun of the Great Mirror Wisdom will shine on 
and break up Ignorance. This light is the Light of Great Wisdom, 
the Light of MahaprajOa. But if this non-duality of self and other 
were taken simply as non-discrimination, it would become the con­
cept of non-discrimination, which is just another law-attachment. 
“Solid frozen all-sameness of the Tathata,” “ice of the one Dharma-
84
ON THE I-THOU RELATION IN ZEN BUDDHISM
Nature,” an ice-covered absolute One or Absolute Identity, etc. 
indicate the higher law- and self-attachments which lie hidden at a 
place beyond ordinary law-attachments and self-attachments. When 
this place is also broken through, then for the first time the true 
Reality is attained, in which a contest of “fragrant freshness” goes 
on, between the self as the self, the other as the other and the law 
as the law. Then the everyday encounters between all men are of 
an infinite freshness and pervaded with infinite fragrance.
In the third line we meet the words “poetry” and “spiritual 
divertissement.” Here, needless to say, the very meeting of man 
with man, just as the fine scenery with its plums and willows, be­
comes an occasion for poetry. This “poetry” is not based on images 
that have been imagined within the human consciousness, nor is it
composition involving man’s language. Here a takes as its
images actual things themselves, and is composed of words which 
all things themselves recite.
The “spiritual divertissement” spoken of is not spiritual diver­
tissement that occurs in the human consciousness, but something 
that arises from the depths of the very being of man and all things. 
This poem is not grounded in a heightened romanticism, rather 
in thorough-going realism. Through thorough penetration into 
Reality as it actually is, Reality comes to be imbued with the charac­
ter of poetry. It is the same as when the struggles in the ultimate 
ground of hostility become play. The “poetry” that appears in the 
place that transcends what is ordinarily referred to as the domain 
of poetry — the poetry that is not created by man, but the poetry in 
which man comes to participate and which takes part in man him­
self as well — what domain would that be ? Now when man casts 
off his small self and piously enters Reality, Great Wisdom (jtrajna) 
opens up as the native place of all things, as the place where they 
emerge and realize themselves as they are — the place of Reality 
itself. This opening up is, directly, none other than man realizing 
Reality in its suchness. The light of Wisdom, in which Reality shines 
and is seen in its suchness, is Reality's own light. The light of this 
“Sun of Wisdom” as it is, is also the insight in which man sees his
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“primary and original face.” And the poetry that cornea to appear 
of itself from that prajnd is the poetry we here speak of. In that 
prajhd the reality of any actual thing whatsoever becomes, as it is, 
the “occasion for poetry and spiritual divertissement,” which contains 
“boundless meaning.”
Hakuin gives the following well-known passage from the Ana­
lects as a jakugo for the third line: —
“At the end of spring, when the making of the 
Spring Clothes has been completed, I would go with 
five or six newly-capped youths and six or seven 
uncapped boys, perform the lustration in the River I, 
take the air at the Rain Dance altars, and then go 
home singing.”
(after Waley)
It might be said of the aforementioned prajna that it is the 
place where not only poetry but also religion, philosophy and morality 
originate — the place where all of them are perhaps united in such 
a way as makes it difficult to separate them, it being prior to them 
all. If that is so, the poetry I refer to here can be said to be the 
domain whence man-made poetry originates and whither it returns, 
as to its own native place which is prior to it. But one cannot easily 
talk about such a secret area of human existence. Here we must 
limit ourselves simply to raising the questions.
The tale of this encounter, which comes to a close with KyOzan 
giving his name and Sansho giving his, ends with Kydzan’s roaring 
laughter. The sound of the laughter is the essence of the whole 
tale. It is here the struggle — which is really a “sportive samadhi" 
—• it is here the joint singing and clapping, drumming and dancing, 
all come to an end. This was a battleground, a place where man 
sang in unison, now it is altogether different. It has turned back 
to the place of origin. It is like the ancient battlefield spoken of by 
the haiku poet Basho :
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All 1 Summer grasses !
All that remains
Of the warriors’ dreams.
(translation Blyth)
The men who fought here, which is to say the men who sang 
together here, those who stood face to face, are now long vanished. 
KyOzan and Sansho are now gone. Only Ryazan's roaring laughter 
still resounds through the air. Daito Kokushi ‘caps’ this with 
“Whither does this go ?” Of course he is not merely after infor­
mation, he is pointing to the place where KyOzan hides in laughter. 
In this “place of laughter” the reality of the encounter between one 
man and another may be transformed as it is into super-reality. 
It is not of course the reality of surrealism. Here, it could be said, 
reality manifests itself in its original aspect of super-reality. Such 
is the implication of the words “the occasion for poetry and spiritual 
divertissement holds boundless meaning” — but we can speak of it 
no further. To understand the boundless meaning held here is per­
mitted only to “the man who wanders in the fields and arduously 
composes poetry.” The figure of the poet struggling to make poetry 
in order to transmit this meaning — which he has understood — to 
others, may be said to suggest the agreement of Mahdprajha and 
Mah&karund that are contained in Ryazan’s great laughter. This 
third line, together with the jakugo “Whither does this go ?” may 
be said to be the ecce homo of DaitO Kokushi himself.
(Translated by N. A. Waddell.)
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